Wright State University

CORE Scholar
International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology - 2005

International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology

2005

Pilot Dependence on Imperfect Diagnostic Automation in
Simulated UAV Flights: An Attentional Visual Scanning Analysis.
Christopher WIckens
Stephen Dixon
Juliana Goh
Ben Hammer

Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2005
Part of the Other Psychiatry and Psychology Commons

Repository Citation
WIckens, C., Dixon, S., Goh, J., & Hammer, B. (2005). Pilot Dependence on Imperfect Diagnostic
Automation in Simulated UAV Flights: An Attentional Visual Scanning Analysis.. 2005 International
Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 818-823.
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2005/96

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the International Symposium on Aviation Psychology at
CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Symposium on Aviation Psychology - 2005 by an
authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu.

PILOT DEPENDENCE ON IMPERFECT DIAGNOSTIC AUTOMATION
IN SIMULATED UAV FLIGHTS: AN ATTENTIONAL VISUAL SCANNING ANALYSIS.
Christopher Wickens, Stephen Dixon, Juliana Goh and Ben Hammer
University of Illinois, Aviation Human Factors Division
Savoy, Illinois
An unmanned air vehicle (UAV) simulation was designed to reveal the effects of imperfectly reliable diagnostic
automation – a monitor of system health parameters – on pilot attention, as the latter was assessed via visual
scanning. Four groups of participants flew a series of legs under different automation conditions: a baseline (no
automation) control, and automation which was either 100% reliable, 60% reliable with a low-threshold bias to
produce false alerts, and 60% reliable with a high threshold to produce misses. A high workload mission completion
task and ground surveillance task were simultaneously imposed. Consistent with the reliance-compliance model of
imperfect automation developed by Meyer (2001), miss-prone automation removed visual attention from the
surveillance task, while FA-prone automation delayed the alert-driven attention shift to the system monitoring task.
Introduction
Unmanned air vehicles (UAV) have realized a recent
successful history in military aviation, and presently
are forecast to play an important role in civil aviation,
either as military UAVs must transition through
civilian airspace, or as UAVs are called upon to
perform non-military functions such a border
surveillance or cargo transport. UAVs, almost by
definition, will require high levels of automation, and
hence bring into play issues of pilot monitoring of
that automation. Whether the pilot is called on to
supervise a single UAV, as in most intended civilian
applications, or two or more UAVs, as envisioned in
many military applications, there are two major
factors that mitigate the effectiveness of automation,
in UAV control (as well as its effectiveness other
aviation systems).

poor when automation is so unreliable as to be
useless. However in between these extremes, lies a
range of reliability levels where the benefits of
automation over the baseline may be uncertain.
Of course there are a wide array of types of
automation that can be employed to assist the UAV
pilot, as well as a wide variety of ways in which
automation can fail. In the current research we focus
on automated alerts, that are of particular value under
high levels of pilot workload, because the attentiongrabbing properties of such alerts typically relieve the
pilot of continuous visual monitoring of the “raw
data” in the “alerted domain”. In our particular
domain, the raw data represent indicators of the
health of various systems on board the aircraft.

The first factor is the level of “workload”
experienced by the human operator. Here we define
workload, as the load imposed on the limited
information processing resources of the unaided
(without automation) human operator, in what we
describe as the “baseline” or “manual” condition.
This load can be imposed from two qualitatively
distinct sources: the single task difficulty of the task
that might otherwise be automated, and the multitask load in which the baseline (vs. automated) task
is performed. In these two cases, the automation
benefits are likely to increase, to the extent that the
single task to be automated is more difficult (Maltz &
Shinar, 2003; Dixon & Wickens, 2004), or that
concurrent or multi-task load is imposed
(Parasuraman et al., 1993).

Three reasons lay behind our selection of this
automated task for our research. First, because
system monitoring is generally lower on the pilot’s
task Hierarchy (Schutte & Trujillo, 1996), it is logical
to relegate this to an automated alert system.
Secondly, interviews with subject matter experts of
the Army’s Hunter-Shadow UAV (Wickens &
Dixon, 2002), revealed the plausibility of rendering
such system failures as relatively frequent events, and
therefore legitimate subjects of an experimental
inquiry of imperfect automation. Finally, the nature
of potential automated failures in monitoring system
events generalizes to a much wider class of
automated diagnostic systems in aviation, such as
conflict and collision alerts (Bliss, 2003; Pritchett,
2001), so that lessons learned regarding the
implications of this imperfect automation for pilot
attention and decision, can be widely applied.

The second factor is automation reliability. There is
little doubt that total human-system performance will
be quite good if automation is perfect. Conversely,
when performing a difficult task, performance will be

Underlying our current modeling approach is the fact
that automated diagnostic systems must discriminate
two kinds of events: a “failure” and a “normal
operating condition”. When asked to make such a
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discrimination in a probabilistic imperfect world,
with potentially unreliable sensors, automation will
make occasional errors. It is then the responsibility of
the alert designer to “set the threshold” of the alerting
system to achieve the appropriate balance of alert
misses, and alert false alarms. Generally, designers
have chosen to bias this setting in favor of a low
threshold, which generates many more false alerts,
than it does missed events (Pritchett, 2001); however,
neither type of automation error is immune from
human performance costs, imposed on the pilot who
must (a) respond to the alert output (if it is true), (b)
provide some attention to the “raw data” (to the
extent that the alerting system may be miss-prone)
and (c) perform a host of attention demanding
concurrent tasks.
Some more specific description of what these costs
are, emerges from a treatment of alert systems
developed by Meyer (2001, 2004; Maltz & Shinar,
2003), who distinguishes between two cognitive
states of human dependence on alerting automation:
Reliance, characterizes human cognition when the
alert is silent. A reliant operator will assume that the
alert will unfailingly sound when the raw data go out
of tolerance, and hence will have no need to examine
those data while the alert is silent. Full residual
attention will be available for concurrent tasks.
However an imperfect alerting setting that generates
automation misses will reduce reliance, at the
expense of visual attention to concurrent tasks.
Compliance, in contrast, characterizes the operator
response when the alert sounds. A highly compliant
operator will rapidly abandon concurrent tasks and
switch attention to the alerting domain once the alert
sounds. However an imperfect alerting setting that
generates many false alarms (the more frequent type
of setting) will reduce compliance, even if this setting
has minimal effect on reliance.
In a pair of UAV simulation experiments, Dixon and
Wickens (2004; Dixon Wickens and Chang, 2005, in
press) varied the auditory alerting threshold as well as
the overall reliability of system monitor gauges in their
simulated UAV. Examining performance on the
system monitoring task itself, along with performance
of a concurrent image surveillance task, and a primary
mission task, they were able to demonstrate
performance effects that appeared to mirror some of
the expected changes in reliance and compliance:
increasing automation miss rate reduced concurrent
monitoring; increasing automation false alert rate
reduced pilot response to system failures. Both of these
effects reflect the inferred influence of automation
reliability on pilot attention, either to monitor

concurrent tasks, rather than the raw data (indexing
high reliance), or to be immediately switched when an
alert occurs (for a compliant pilot). however we had no
direct measures of the allocation of visual attention, as
revealed through visual scanning measures. Because of
the critical role played by visual attention in aviation
(Talleur & Wickens, 2003; Wickens, Goh, Helleberg,
Horrey & Talleur, 2003), in the current study, we
measured these scan patterns as four groups of pilots
monitored simulations that varied in the reliability of
the automated system status monitor: a 100% reliable
system, an unreliable system (r = 0.60) with a bias to
false alerts, an equally unreliable system (r = 0.60)
with a bias to misses, and a baseline system with no
auditory alerting whatsoever. In each system we
measured performance, as well as the balance of visual
attention between the system gauges and concurrent
tasks (measuring miss-influenced reliance), and the
visual attention switching time following an alert
(measuring false-alert influenced compliance).
Methods
39 student pilots from the Institute of Aviation
volunteered to participate in the experiment. They
were paid $9.00/hour. Each pilot flew the UAV
through ten different mission legs (one practice, 9
experimental), while completing three goal-oriented
tasks commonly associated with UAV flight control:
mission completion, target search, and systems
monitoring. They used the interface shown in figure 1.
At the beginning of each mission leg, pilots obtained
flight instructions via the Message Box, including flyto coordinates and a report question pertaining to the
next command target (CT). These instructions were
present for 15 seconds; in case the pilot forgot the
instructions, pressing a repeat key refreshed the flight
instructions for an additional 15 seconds.
Once pilots arrived at the CT location, they loitered
around the target, manipulated a simulated camera
for closer target inspection, and reported back
relevant information to mission command (e.g., What
weapons are located on the south side of the
building?). This challenging CT report demanded
motor, visual and cognitive resources (Gugerty &
Brooks, 2001). Along each mission leg, pilots were
also responsible for detecting and reporting lowsalience targets of opportunity (TOO), a task similar
to the CT report, except that the TOOs were much
smaller (1-2 degrees of visual angle) and
camouflaged. TOOs could occur during simple
tracking (low workload) or during a pilot response to
a system failure as described below (high workload).
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the threshold was set (i.e., whether the automation
would produce false more false alarms or misses).
Results
Primary Task performance. The pilots’ primary task
was to fly the UAV to the command targets and make
the report. Neither tracking accuracy nor CT report
were much effected by automation reliability level,
nor did this level effect pilot’s memory for the CT
information (as implicitly measured by the use of the
“repeat” key). Hence pilots optimally protected this
most important task from resource competition
imposed by other tasks.
TOO monitoring. Prior studies had shown that this
“secondary” task of monitoring the 3D image
window was sensitive to the demands imposed by
imperfection of the automation (Dixon & Wickens,
2004). Table 1a shows performance on the TOO task
as a function of condition.

Figure 1: The Experimental Display.
Concurrently, pilots were also required to monitor the
system gauges for possible system failures (SF). This
was the “automated task”. SFs were designed to fail
either during simple tracking (low workload) or
during TOO/CT inspection (high workload). The SFs
lasted 30 seconds, after which the screen flashed
bright red and a salient auditory alarm announced
that the pilot had failed to detect the SF. There were a
total of 10 SFs, with never more than two SFs
occurring during any mission leg.
Automation aids, in the form of auditory auto-alerts
during SFs, were provided for three of the four
conditions. The A100 condition (A = automation,
100% reliable) never failed to alert pilots of SFs. The
A60f condition (f = false alarm, 60% reliable) failed
by producing 3 false alarms and 1 miss out of the 10
SFs. The A60m condition (m = miss) failed by
failing to notify pilots of a system failure on 3 of the
10 SFs, while generating a single false alarm. The
final condition was a baseline manual condition ,
with no automation aid to assist pilot performance.
Pilots were not aware of the precise level of
reliability of each automation aid; they were simply
told that the automation was either “perfectly
reliable” or “not perfectly reliable” and which way

We focused our analysis on TOO responses that only
occurred under low workload conditions, in which a
system failure had not occurred (i.e., during the
period of reliance) and observed the trend in both
accuracy and speed to be degraded with less reliable
automation, particularly in the miss-prone condition
[although this trend was not significant for RT, and
only marginally so for detection rate (F3, 26 = 2.31,
p=.10)].
Table 1. TOO and system failure monitoring/
detection performance.
Baseline A100
(a) TOO
(low workload)
Acc (%) 89.00
82.00
RT (S)
6.05
6.50
(b) System Failure
Low workload
Acc
100.00 100.00
RT
7.19
2.18
High workload
Acc
92.00 100.00
RT
11.46
4.82

A60F

A60M

75.00
7.64

61.00
10.10

100.00
3.02

100.00
3.36

42.00
23.28

58.00
14.77

System Failure Detection. Analysis of the system
failure data revealed no effects of automation
reliability at low workload, but that response times
were faster when any type of automation was present,
F(3,26) = 5.40, p < .01. Importantly, highly
significant effects of reliability emerged at high
workload, as revealed by the significant load X
condition interaction in both Accuracy, F(3,26) =
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7.91, p < .01, and RT, F(3,26) = 9.65, p < .01. Our
particular interest was in the differential cost between
miss-prone and false alarm-prone automation, where,
in the high workload condition, both accuracy
(t=1.96, p=.04), and RT (t=3.53, p<.01) demonstrated
a greater cost in the false-alarm prone condition than
in the miss-prone condition.
Thus the emerging picture is one in which
performance on both tasks suffers when automation
reliability degrades, but SF performance degrades
more severely, particularly in high workload, and
with false-alarm prone automation, whereas
monitoring of the 3D image window for TOOs
degrades only slightly, and even then only in the
miss-prone condition. Thus we now ask whether
visual scanning behavior, a direct manifestation of
attention allocation and switching, can provide any
insight as to the role of reliance and compliance in
mediating the above effects.
Visual Attention allocation. Table 2 provides a
measure of the percent dwell time (PDT) that the
eyes spent within each of the four areas of interest
(AOI) on the workstation. The data are only reported
during steady state (low workload) monitoring, not
during the high workload segments involving
zooming and panning of the 3D image window to
identify detected targets. It is during this low
workload period that pilots rely upon automation to
alert them if such a system failure occurs.
Table 2. Percentage Dwell Time that visual fixation is
spent for the four experimental conditions within each
area of interest (AOI): 3D image display where the
TOOs were located, the 2D navigation display, the
System failure monitoring gauges, and Message Box.

AOI
3D (TOO)
2D
SF
MB

Baseline

A100

A60F

A60M

50.0
36.7
13.0
4.1

58.7
39.2
5.7
6.6

56.4
32.2
11.3
9.0

45.5
35.1
18.6
11.9

A 2 way (AOI X condition) ANOVA carried out on
the PDT data revealed a significant effect of AOI,
F(3, 78) = 155.75, p < .001. The 3D image window,
hosting the most demanding surveillance and
detection task demanded the most visual attention,
the 2D nav display, hosting the most important task
(command target location information) required
around a third of the pilot’s attention, and the two
remaining AOIs demanded the least. Importantly, the
significant AOI X condition interaction, F(9,78) =
2.41, p = .05, reflected automation reliance. Here we

see that visual attention to the TOO window
benefited (relative to baseline 50%) from having
auditory alerts, whether these were fully reliable
[100A, t(14) = 2.05, p < .03], or imperfect, but
having few misses [60F, [t(13) = 1.34, p = .10].
However miss-prone automation drew as much, if not
more visual attention away from the 3D window
(45.5%) as this window received in the baseline
condition (50%). While this decrease from the
baseline was not significant, the difference between
miss prone and false alarm prone automation was
significant [t(13) = 1.7, p = .06], indicating the shift
in attention to concurrent tasks, fostered by a
designer’s decision to change the alerting threshold.
Scanning to the 2D image display, hosting
information for primary task navigation performance
did not differ significantly between conditions,
indicating how pilots treated this display which
hosted primary task information, as of utmost
priority. However scanning to the SF gauges
themselves reflected an expected pattern, opposite to
that of the 3D image window. While perfect
automation (A100) greatly reduced the visual
attention required, relative to baseline [t(13) = 3.97,
p<.01], the miss-prone automation condition required
far more visual attention to this display, as expected
given that pilots are, presumably, paying more
attention to the “raw data” compared to the false
alarm prone condition [t(13) = 2.05, p=.03], which
did not differ from baseline. An additional feature is
that pilots paid even more attention (18%) in the
miss-prone condition, than in the non-automated
baseline (13%, t = 1.71, p<.05), a cost that, as we saw
above, bought them nothing in terms of better SF
detection performance. There was no difference in
scanning to the message box across conditions.
One might not have expected the false alarm rate to
influence reliance, and indeed it did not appear to
influence the measures of the residual attention to the
3D image window where the TOOs appeared. However
somewhat surprisingly, the higher FA rate did compel
more attention to the SF display than the fully reliable
automation condition, and induced no less attention
there than the baseline condition. Thus no attention was
“saved” by FA-prone automation relative to the
baseline, in spite of the fact that nearly all failures were
alerted. Thus, the general distrust induced by false
alarms may have led to pilot suspicion that such a
system requires further monitoring.
Visual Scan Response time. We inferred that
compliance would be related to the speed with which
visual attention moved to the SF gauges from
wherever it was located at the time that the alert
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occurred. These measurements were computed by
hand from a time-file of scanning across the 4 AOIs.
The data for these “scan RT’s” are shown in Table 3
when the alerts occurred during the high workload
period while the pilot was engaged in image scanning:

additional 7.5 seconds of examining the raw data to
assure that the alert was a true one, before an overt
response was given. Overall, this delay, reflecting the
cost of false-alarm prone automation, is of significant
duration to be of significant operational importance.

Table 3. Scan RTs in seconds. (baseline scans
represent the delay between the SF and the first look
at the display. All others represent the delay between
the auditory alert and the first look).

The current data reinforces the notion that imperfect
automation effects can be well modeled by their
influence on pilot attention, and that such effects can
be profound if automation reliability is allowed to
drop to levels of around 60%, well below the
threshold of approximately 70% reliability revealed
to determine when automation is no longer useful
(Wickens & Dixon, 2005). While such rates may
seem, at first glance, to be unrealistically low, it
should be noted that in many aviation circumstances
diagnostic automation is asked to predict events in a
probabilistic world, plagued by future uncertainties in
such variables as human response, or turbulence (Xu,
Rantanen & Wickens, 2005; Thomas, Wickens &
Rantanen, 2003; Krois, 1999). Under such
circumstances, reliability rates not unlike those
examined here, may be expected. It is therefore
important that the consequences of these rates to
pilot/supervisor performance are well understood.

Baseline

A100

A60F

A60M

19s

4.5s

16 s

4.0s

A one way ANOVA on these data revealed a highly
significant effect of condition, F(3,29) = 5.806, p =
.004, revealing that looks were as rapid in the missprone condition, as in the perfect automation
condition (pilots’ perfectly complying with the
alerts), but were as slow in the false-alarm condition
as were the unaided glance times.
Discussion
The current results extended the previous findings of
imperfect diagnostic automation in UAVs (Dixon &
Wickens, in press) to consider the explicit response
of pilot attention, underlying the two inferred
constructs of reliance and compliance. These two
constructs characterize a pilot’s response to
automation that has a low miss rate and a low false
alarm rate respectively.
As in the previous study, we found that an increasing
miss rate produced a marginal loss in concurrent task
performance. In the current data we noted that this
was paralleled (and presumably caused) by a reallocation of visual attention away from the 3D
image window, toward the raw data hosted within the
SF display (i.e., toward the oscillating bars
representing system parameter health).
Also as in the previous study, we found that an
increasing automation false alert rate, while having
little effect on concurrent task performance (or
attention allocation to the concurrent task), yielded a
pronounced loss in SF detection performance in high
workload, causing misses of some true alerts, and
substantial delays in responding to all alerts.
Interestingly, the increase in mean response time from
the perfect automation condition to the A60F condition
was 19 sec (Table 1b), whereas the increase in mean
scan RT was only 11.5 sec (Table 3). Such a difference
indicates that, when false alarm rate was high, alertdriven looks to the display were followed by an

Acknowledgments
This research was sponsored by subcontract #ARMY
MAD 6021.000-01 from Microanalysis and Design,
as part of the Army Human Engineering Laboratory
Robotics CTA, contracted to General Dynamics.
David Dahn was the scientific/technical monitor. Any
opinions,
findings,
and
conclusions
or
recommendations expressed in this paper are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Army. The authors also wish to acknowledge the
support of Ron Carbonari and Jonathan Sivier (in
developing the UAV simulation).
References
Bliss, J. (2003). An investigation of alarm related
accidents and incidents in aviation. International
Journal of Aviation Psychology, 13(3), 249-268.
Dixon, S. R., & Wickens, C. D. (in press).
Automation reliability in unmanned aerial vehicle
flight control: Evaluating a model of automation
dependence in high workload. Human Factors.
Dixon, S. R., Wickens, C. D., & Chang, D.
(2005, in press). Mission control of unmanned air
vehicles: A workload analysis. Human Factors, 47.

822

Gugerty, L., & Brooks, J. (2001). Seeing where
you are heading: Integrating environmental and
egocentric reference frames in cardinal direction
judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Applied, 7(3), 251-266.
Krois, P. (1999, July 25). White Paper: Human
factors assessment of the URET conflict probe false
alert rate. Washington, DC: Federal Aviation
Administration.
Maltz, M., & Shinar, D. (2003). New alternative
methods of analyzing human behavior in cued target
acquisition. Human Factors, 45(2), 281-295.
Meyer, J. (2001). Effects of warning validity and
proximity on responses to warnings. Human Factors,
43, 563-572.
Meyer, J. (2004). Conceptual issues in the study
of dynamic hazard warnings. Human Factors.

10/MAD-02-1). Savoy, IL: University of Illinois,
Aviation Research Laboratory.
Wickens, C. D., & Dixon, S. (2005). Is there a
magic number 7 (to the minus 1)? The benefits of
imperfect diagnostic automation: A synthesis of the
literature (AHFD-05-1/MAAD-05-1). Savoy, IL:
University of Illinois, Aviation Human Factors
Division.
Wickens, C. D., Goh, J., Helleberg, J., Horrey,
W., & Talleur, D. A. (2003). Attentional models of
multitask pilot performance using advanced display
technology. Human Factors, 45(3), 360-380.
Xu, X., Rantanen, E. & Wickens, C. D. (2005).
Effects of conflict warning system reliability and task
difficulty on pilots’ conflict detection with cockpit
display of traffic information. Proceedings of the
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.
Dayton, OH: Wright State University.

Parasuraman, R. M., Molloy, R., & Singh, I. L.
(1993). Performance consequences of automation
induced “complacency”. International Journal of
Aviation Psychology, 3, 1-23.
Pritchett, A. (2001). Reviewing the role of
cockpit alerting systems. Human Factors &
Aerospace Safety, 1, 5-38.
Schutte, P. C., & Trujillo, A. C. (1996). Flight
crew task management in non-normal situations.
Proceedings of the 40th Annual Meeting of the Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society (pp. 244-248). Santa
Monica, CA: HFES.
Talleur, D.A., & Wickens, C.D. (2003). The
effect of pilot visual scanning strategies on traffic
detection accuracy and aircraft control. Proceedings
of the 12th International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology. Dayton, OH: Wright State University.
Thomas, L.C. Wickens, C.D., & Rantanen, E.M.
(2003). Imperfect automation in aviation traffic
alerts: A review of conflict detection algorithms and
their implications for human factors research.
Proceedings of the 47th Annual Meeting of the
Human Factors & Ergonomics Society. Santa
Monica, CA: HFES.
Wickens, C. D., & Dixon, S. (2002). Workload
demands of remotely piloted vehicle supervision and
control: (I) Single vehicle performance (ARL-02-

823

